AIRPORT EXPANSION

In early 2006 events around the Toronto Island Airport happened with dizzying speed. Through the federal election citizens demanded explanation of what was happening to the island airport, but there were few answers. Then, no more than a week after the election, the airport was again the top news story in Toronto.

On February 1st Robert Deluce hosted an elaborate press conference at Bombardier’s aircraft plant in Downsview. There, in front of a crowd of airline executives and Bay Street financiers, he announced that he had raised $120 million in private money and was starting a new company called Porter Airlines that would operate out of the Toronto Island Airport. Porter had bought four Q400 turboprops that would fly to Montreal and Ottawa.

On the same day, and at the same Deluce/Porter press conference, the Toronto Port Authority announced that its board had decided to go ahead with the expansion of the airport, using the new ferry boat. There was no mention that its own business plan and Robert Deluce, himself, had said that a bridge to the island airport was absolutely essential if airport expansion plans were to be successful.

With those two announcements, it became obvious that these plans had been in the works for months, if not years, and the port authority and Deluce were just waiting until after the election to release them. But what was lost on the press and the public at the time was that this expansion plan was a clever way to do an “end run” around city council. This expansion plan did not require the permission of the City of Toronto, where the majority of city councillors had expressed opposition to island airport expansion. It could be achieved simply with the approval of the Toronto Port Authority board of directors, and at that time the board consisted of one person, Michele McCarthy, the representative of the Province of Ontario.

These announcements launched yet another round of intense public debate about island airport expansion. There were almost daily exchanges in the press, with CommunityAIR playing a prominent role in criticizing the scheme. Other Toronto community groups vowed to fight airport expansion. Letters were written to the prime minister and the minister of transport demanding an inquiry into the operations of the TPA.

Then on February 15, 2006, The Toronto Port Authority, Henry Pankratz, Lisa Raitt and Alan Paul launched a libel suit against seven members of CommunityAIR. Some of the press came to the defense of CAIR. “Democracy demands wide leeway for the public to comment on political matters,” editorialized The Star. (The Toronto Star, June 24, 2006) But the TPA did not withdraw the suit. CommunityAIR pressed on with its campaign. (The suit was finally settled in the spring of 2007.)

The port authority was very aggressive in promoting its interests in this period. During the spring of 2006, it spent $335,000 in a media campaign that included advertisements in the press and on radio. It also hired five lobbyists in Ottawa to lobby the federal government. The TPA was lobbying the very government that had created their agency. Later they bragged how successful this campaign had been. (John Barber, The Globe and Mail, May 27, 2006)

On March 1, 2006, just a month after the launch of Porter Airlines, it was announced that Air Canada Jazz had been forced out of the island airport by a combination of the port authority, Porter Airlines and Robert Deluce. Jazz was flying four flights a day from the island airport to Ottawa. The company used the passenger terminal and a hangar owned by Stolport, and it wanted to maintain these flights and even expand service.

It was then revealed that not only had Deluce bought three hangars at the airport, but he had also entered into an agreement with the port authority to manage the airport until 2033. This contract gave him sole control over the passenger terminal and allowed him to cut off services to Jazz. It also became public that the Toronto Port Authority was insisting that Jazz sign a highly restrictive commercial carrier operating agreement, limiting Jazz to approximately 16% of the slots at the airport. Jazz claimed that this agreement was not part of the standard operating agreements that existed across Canada, and that the agreement was being used to drive Jazz out of the island airport so it could be turned over to Porter. The TPA would not back down.

The upshot was that Air Canada Jazz was forced to cancel all flights out of the island airport. The dispute remains before the courts. Jazz claims that Porter has been given a virtual monopoly over the island airport, its landing rights, routes and passenger-handling facilities. They assert that the airport is a publicly owned facility and that an untendered contract has delivered this public facility to one private airline promoter. This is unheard of in the industry.

The Tassé Inquiry
With controversy swirling around the airport, pressure mounted on the new Conservative government. Stephen Harper, the prime minister, was asked what he was going to do about the Toronto Port Authority. He replied candidly, “I am troubled by some of the decisions that have been made regarding the port authority and the island airport. We are determined to get to the bottom of it.” (City TV, April 12, 2006) Finally, on May 1, 2006, the federal government announced that it was appointing Roger Tassé to conduct an independent review of the operations of the TPA and report by September 1st.

Members of CommunityAIR and other community groups were excited. The press felt vindicated. It looked as if the federal government were finally going to act to resolve the most intractable local political issue in Toronto. People remembered that it was the Conservative provincial government of Bill Davis that killed the Spadina Expressway. Maybe a Conservative federal government would finally kill the airport expansion that threatened Toronto’s waterfront.

Mr. Tassé seemed perfect for the job. He was from Montreal and had not been caught up in the dispute. A lawyer, Tassé had been the deputy minister of justice in the Mulroney government. A person with credentials like that could not be easily ignored.

Over the next few months, Tassé consulted with interested parties. CommunityAIR met with him and submitted a brief of over 100 pages. There was speculation on what he might recommend. There were divided opinions on whether he would stop the airport expansion, but most of those who followed the issue were convinced that Tassé would recommend disbanding the port authority and turning its assets and management over to the city. There was no economic justification for keeping the TPA alive, and poor management had brought it into such disrepute that in Toronto it had become a symbol of government ineptitude.

The first indication that the Stephen Harper federal government was not going to disband the port authority came in August 2006 when the government appointed five new members to the TPA board, two of whom had close ties to the Conservative government. But when Tassé published his report in October, reporters, politicians and the public were astonished that he had virtually exonerated the port authority of any blame in the ongoing controversy.

Olivia Chow, MP called it “a total whitewash which shows the utter contempt for the City of Toronto, the people who live at Toronto’s Waterfront and the public interest.” (The Globe and Mail, November 3, 2006)

Mayor David Miller said, “It’s really quite stunning how naïve it is. [The report] is tepid…insubstantive…and astonishing…[It is] not worth the paper it’s printed on.” (The Globe and Mail, November 3, 2006)

An editorial in The Toronto Star said “A disappointing federal report has given tacit approval to the Toronto Port Authority for its handling of the Toronto island airport… [Tassé] failed to grasp the significance of the Waterfront revitalization issue to Toronto residents.” (The Toronto Star, November 4, 2006)

The Globe and Mail columnist John Barber wrote “What Mr. Tassé offers is … complete contempt for Toronto and its government. His report skirts and suppresses one bald truth after another as it follows a confusing stepping-stone dance among carefully selected facts embedded in a thick mulch of relevant minutae…As Mr. Tassé’s evasive bumbling and stumbling demonstrates, the time has come to test the so-called truth.” (The Globe and Mail, November 3, 2006)

But John Barber did manage to dig one nugget out of the report. Tassé revealed that Robert Deluce had negotiated a special clause in his agreement with the port authority that allowed him to sue the taxpayers of Canada in the event the airport closed down. This clause goes against the 1983 Tripartite Agreement that demands that the port authority use its “best efforts” to write leases with new tenants that terminate automatically in the event the airport closes. The TPA had given Deluce and Porter a “poison pill” to try to prevent the airport closing. (The Globe and Mail, November 3, 2006) Not only had the Toronto Port Authority organized a massive expansion of the island airport, against the wishes of the majority of the people, but it had made the people of Canada liable for damages, if the airport should close.

Robert Deluce, President of Porter Airlines.

Porter Takes Off
The federal government had cleared the path for airport expansion. On September 26th Transport Canada gave final approval for Porter’s plans to launch commercial air service at the Toronto Island Airport. The deal was done. Porter’s Q400 aircraft were delivered on time by Bombardier, and on October 23rd they launched their maiden flights to Ottawa and Montreal. Mayor Miller’s promise to “Stop Island Airport Expansion” had failed.

Since that time CommunityAIR’s objections to flights from the island airport have been frustrated by the federal government. CAIR provided Transport Canada with evidence showing that, according to the manufacturer’s specifications, the Q400 violated the noise specifications of the Tripartite Agreement. This issue has been ignored. Second, the group showed that the Q400 is not a STOL (Short Take-Off and Landing) aircraft, and therefore, does not comply with the terms of the Tripartite Agreement. This claim was rejected when Transport Canada ruled that the Q400 is a Dash 8 and the Dash 8 has been approved for use. How that is possible when the Q400 is at least twice as large and 50% heavier than the Dash 8 was never recognized.

Early in 2007 Porter applied to the U.S. Department of Transportation to fly into the United States. At first there was some controversy around this application. Air Canada and other airlines argued that Porter had been given a virtual monopoly over the island airport, and other carriers could not use the facility. But ultimately the application was approved.

Porter acquired two more Q400 aircraft in early 2008 and on March 31 began flying six return flights a day from the Island Airport to Newark, N.J. Robert Deluce has said that Porter intends to increase its fleet to 20 aircraft. If that happens, Toronto Island Airport, located in the heart of the city, on the Waterfront, will become one of the busiest airports in the country.

CommunityAIR continues to oppose the airport and promote a clean, green waterfront. Every Friday evening there is a demonstration on Eireann Quay – Lower Bathurst Street – to dramatize these issues and underline our opposition to airport expansion. We know that the public continues to support our efforts, but as yet, federal politicians have sided with Porter Airlines and the Toronto Port Authority against the people.

The question has to be asked: Why are Porter Airlines, Robert Deluce and the Toronto Port Authority being allowed to expand the island airport against the people, and why are they able to avoid the almost universal demands in Toronto for the dissolution of the TPA? There can only be one answer. A small group of people who want airport expansion and can profit from it are using their political power to influence the Harper government.